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Should mergers among nonprofit organizations be assessed differently than
mergers among for-profit firms? A recent debate in law and economics,
boosted by apparently one-sided court decisions, has produced the result
that promoting competition is socially valuable regardless of the particular
objectives of producers. In this paper, I challenge the general validity of this
result by showing that it may indeed depend on the particular objectives of
producers whether a merger between two nonprofits is welfare-decreasing or
-increasing. This implies that it is impossible to assess the net effects of a
merger between two nonprofits without examining the objectives of the
owners involved.
JEL: L44; L31; L22; K21
I. INTRODUCTION
Should mergers among nonprofit organizations be regulated? If so, should
they be treated differently by antitrust law from mergers among for-profit
firms? According to Richman, U.S. courts seem to believe so.1 Focusing
on the hospital market, he reports that antitrust enforcement agencies
have lost “each of the seven suits initiated since 1994 to challenge pro-
posed hospital mergers.”2 A major reason for this defeat was that the
empirical evidence on pricing behavior of nonprofits when compared with
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for-profits is largely mixed and suffers from data problems.3 Empirical evi-
dence on the effects of mergers between nonprofits is very limited. An
exception is a case study by Vita and Sacher.4 Courts seemed to grant
merging hospitals the benefit of the doubt. According to Richman, this
was sometimes grounded on ideological reasons;5 for instance, the case of
FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp. “lent support to those who argued that
judges have a deep-seated hostility to subjecting health care providers to
competition.”6
This perceived view of the courts was countered recently. Philipson and
Posner have analyzed the questions raised above and concluded that
“[b]ecause promoting competition turns out to be socially valuable regard-
less of the particular objectives of producers, the fact that antitrust law does
not distinguish between the two sectors [nonprofit and for-profit] is
efficient.”7
Although I do not object to the specific result found by Philipson and
Posner, which is based on modeling output decisions of a monopolistic non-
profit organization maximizing a combination of output and consumption, I
challenge the general validity mentioned in the above quotation. In this
paper, I show that it may indeed depend on the “particular objectives of pro-
ducers” whether a merger between two nonprofits is welfare-decreasing or
-increasing. This implies for antitrust law that it is impossible to assess the
net effects of a merger between two nonprofits without examining the
(likely) objectives of the owners involved.8
My starting point is the idea that, although it is widely undisputed
that owners of for-profit firms maximize profits, it is not clear at all
what decision-makers in nonprofits optimize. An earlier draft of this
paper proposes a governance-based model of nonprofits, which posits
that there exist different types of nonprofit organizations that can be dis-
tinguished by the objective function of the pivotal owner, that is, the
3 For overviews, see Shin-Yi Chou, Asymmetric Information, Ownership and Quality of Care: An
Empirical Analysis of Nursing Homes, 21 J. HEALTH ECON. 293 (2002); Anup Malani, Tomas
Philipson & Guy David, Theories of Firm Behavior in the Nonprofit Sector: A Synthesis and
Empirical Evaluation, in THE GOVERNANCE OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 181–215
(Univ. of Chicago Press 2003).
4 Michael G. Vita & Seth Sacher, The Competitive Effects of Not-for-Profit Hospital Mergers:
A Case Study, 49 J. INDUS. ECON. 63 (2001).
5 See Richman, supra note 1, at 125.
6 Id. at 134.
7 Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the Not-for-Profit Sector, 52 J.L. & ECON.
1, 3 (2009) (emphasis added).
8 Here the term “owners” is used for the persons holding residual de facto control over an
organization, as is common in the property rights literature initiated by Sanford J. Grossman
& Oliver Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,
94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986), and Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature
of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119 (1990). In contrast, an owner can or cannot have rights to
residual income. In nonprofits, the nondistribution constraint explicitly waives income rights.










person who is decisive in the nonprofit’s decision-making process.9 In
the paper at hand, I only model one type, a so-called consumer-
dominated nonprofit, because this is sufficient to show that owner objec-
tives can critically matter for the welfare effects of mergers. Nevertheless,
it is necessary to employ a mathematical model to show under which
conditions a merger can actually increase welfare—and to demonstrate
the transmission channels of this effect.
I model duopoly competition with quality-differentiated goods in a
game related to that of Shaked and Sutton,10 where the players first deter-
mine quality levels and second prices. The healthcare market serves as a
suitable application; higher education is an alternative. I assume that con-
sumers (patients) have inelastic demand for a basic service and hetero-
geneous preferences for additional quality. In a consumer-dominated
nonprofit, the pivotal owner has an interest in buying the product himself
and may have a preference for additional quality. When determining the
quality produced, he will thus trade off the consumption utility from high
quality and the price that all consumers, including himself, must pay for
the product. Nonprofits are prohibited both from making losses and from
distributing potential profits to their owners; that is, they face a nondistri-
bution constraint. After characterizing equilibrium behavior under duopoly
competition, I impose a merger on the two organizations and examine its
welfare effects.
Compared with Philipson and Posner, I enrich the scope of analysis by
(1) introducing quality as a strategic variable, (2) introducing strategic
duopoly competition, (3) analyzing the effect of mergers among consumer-
dominated nonprofits, and (4) introducing an agency problem within the
nonprofit by assuming “separation of ownership and control.” (4) refers to
the assumption that, in each nonprofit, owners take long-term decisions by
determining quality, although the day-to-day business is run by an employed
manager who determines the price level. To maximize his leeway to enjoy
nonmonetary perks, I assume the manager maximizes profits. The cost func-
tion of the nonprofit is unobservable for owners, who have no specialized
business knowledge. Hence, the manager has some discretion with respect
to pricing.
The key result of this paper is that, even without assuming economies of
scale, merging two consumer-dominated nonprofits can increase total
welfare. The intuition for this result is the following. First, I find that there
is no equilibrium in which the owners set different quality levels. This
insight complements Shaked and Sutton, who show that profit-maximizing
9 Jens Prüfer, Competition and Mergers Among Nonprofits (Tilburg University, CentER
Discussion Paper 2007-82, 2007).
10 Avner Shaked & John Sutton, Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation, 49
REV. ECON. STUD. 3 (1982).










firms always differentiate quality levels in equilibrium.11 Producing the same
quality level confronts the managers with Bertrand price competition in a
homogeneous goods market. Consequently, outside competition constrains
managers from setting a price above marginal cost. Owners can foresee this
effect. If they have a high personal preference for quality, they will determine
a high quality level. However, this can be higher than the welfare-optimal
quality level, yielding too much quality and driving some consumers out of
the market.
If such duopolistic nonprofits merge and form a monopoly, the monopo-
list’s manager is not constrained by product market competition and sets a
price above marginal cost. To maximize his individual net consumption
utility, the pivotal owner thus needs to reduce the quality level compared
with the duopoly case, thereby reducing overproduction of quality. If the
basic utility from consumption is high and the pivotal owners have a high
preference for quality, the positive effect of reducing too much quality out-
weighs the negative effect of monopoly pricing on total welfare. High levels
of basic utility (or regulated minimum quality) can be found in the hospital
sector, for instance. The total welfare gain is due to the fact that the man-
ager’s monopoly pricing creates positive producer surplus. On a more theor-
etical level, the model provides an example of how one market
imperfection—excessive quality production due to the individual preferences
of nonprofit owners—can sometimes be mitigated by another distortion—
increased market power of the manager.
These results complement Philipson and Posner, as they depend on a
different objective function of nonprofit owners. They imply for antitrust
law that the organizational form of merging parties and their owners’
objectives do matter. Mergers among nonprofit organizations should not
necessarily be treated in the same way as mergers among for-profit firms.
As far as possible, an examination of the owners’ objectives should be
part of merger case analysis involving nonprofits. This notion is absent
in current merger guidelines both in the United States and the
European Union.
This paper is organized as follows. In Part II, I review the related litera-
ture. The model is described in Part III. In Part IV, I describe the effects of
a nonprofit merger from duopoly to monopoly (the appendix contains a
game theoretical treatment of Part IV). I discuss some key assumptions in
Part V and conclude in Part VI.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
This paper relates to several strands of the literature in economics. First, it
shares a common topic, horizontal mergers, with the classical studies of
11 Id.










Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds,12 Deneckere and Davidson,13 Perry and
Porter,14 Farrell and Shapiro,15 and more recent work, such as Bian and
McFetridge16 and Davidson and Mukherjee,17 to name just a few. With the
exception of Philipson and Posner, however, the impact of the organizational
form of the merging parties on the welfare effects of mergers is largely
ignored.
The second strand of related literature is on theories of organizational
choice between the for-profit and the nonprofit forms: Glaeser and
Shleifer,18 Kuan,19 Francois,20 and Herbst and Prüfer21 provide formal
studies contrasting nonprofits and firms. The work of Hansmann22 offers a
valuable descriptive approach. In this literature, the main questions studied
are on the factors that make the nonprofit organizational form more attrac-
tive than profit-maximizing alternatives (apart from tax exemption).
Third, there is a related literature, both theoretical and empirical, that
deals with the question: what is the objective function of nonprofits? Gertler
and Kuan provide an overview of this literature and a clever empirical
approach, based on sales prices of entire nonprofit organizations, for how to
identify the value of a certain nonprofit mission to the sellers of a nonpro-
fit.23 Other empirical studies of nonprofit objectives include Deneffe and
Masson,24 Horwitz,25 and Horwitz and Nichols,26 which identify a set of
12 Stephen W. Salant, Sheldon Switzer & Robert J. Reynolds, Losses from Horizontal Merger: The
Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot–Nash Equilibrium, 98
Q. J. ECON. 185 (1983).
13 Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand
Competition, 16 RAND J. ECON. 473 (1985).
14 Martin K. Perry & Robert H. Porter, Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger, 75
AM. ECON. REV. 219 (1985).
15 Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis, 80 AM. ECON.
REV. 107 (1990).
16 Lin Bian & Donald G. McFetridge, The Efficiencies Defense in Merger Cases: Implications of
Alternative Standards, 33 CAN. J. ECON. 297 (2000).
17 Carl Davidson & Arijit Mukherjee, Horizontal Mergers with Free Entry, 25 INT’L J. INDUS.
ORG. 157 (2007).
18 Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Not-For-Profit Entrepreneurs, 81 J. PUB. ECON. 99
(2001).
19 Jennifer Kuan, The Phantom Profits of the Opera: Nonprofit Ownership in the Arts as a
Make-Buy Decision, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 507 (2001).
20 Patrick Francois, Not-For-Profit Provision of Public Services, 113 ECON. J. C53 (2003).
21 Patrick Herbst & Jens Prüfer, Firms, Nonprofits, and Cooperatives: A Theory of Organizational
Choice (Tilburg University, CentER Discussion Paper 2007–07, 2007).
22 HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (Belknap/Harvard Univ. Press 1996).
23 Paul Gertler & Jennifer Kuan, Does It Matter Who Your Buyer Is? The Role of Nonprofit Mission
in the Market for Corporate Control of Hospitals, 52 J.L. & ECON. 295 (2009).
24 Daniel Deneffe & Robert T. Masson, What Do Not-For-Profit Hospitals Maximize?, 20 INT’L
J. INDUS. ORG. 461 (2002).
25 Jill R. Horwitz, Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 139 (2007).
26 Jill R. Horwitz & Austin Nichols, Hospital Ownership and Medical Services: Market Mix,
Spillover Effects, and Nonprofit Objectives, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 924 (2009).










several objective functions in practice. In an earlier draft of this paper, I
propose a governance-based model of nonprofits and speculate that there
exist different types of nonprofit organizations that can be distinguished by
the objective function of the pivotal owner.27 The paper at hand relates to
that approach but only models one type, a so-called consumer-dominated
nonprofit.
Fourth, Glaeser28 speculates that competition among nonprofits is impor-
tant to keep those organizations well governed. This idea is supported by
the main result of my paper, which shows that product market competition
can substitute for the absence of binding intraorganizational constraints,
that is, good internal governance. Castaneda, Garen, and Thornton study
the effects of competition for donors on the behavior of nonprofits.29 They
examine neither competition on the product market nor mergers among
nonprofits, though.
The paper most closely related to this one is Philipson and Posner, which
builds on Lakdawalla and Philipson.30 In those models, the owners of non-
profit organizations prefer increased output. The main result is that, after a
merger, nonprofit organizations have the same incentives to reduce output
and, hence, to decrease social welfare as for-profit firms. This result is based
on the assumption that nonprofit owners can exchange profits into own con-
sumption. Consequently, the owners appear as de facto profit maximizers.
This assumption is inconsistent with the formal nondistribution constraint. I
should note, however, that some other authors also allow nonprofits to dis-
tribute profits to their owners, be it directly (Chau and Huysentruyt31) or
indirectly via price subsidies (Kuan32) or via nonmonetary perks an owner
or manager of a nonprofit could extract (Glaeser and Shleifer33). In turn,
Bilodeau, and Slivinsky34 and Francois35 assume in their models that the
nondistribution constraint cannot be relaxed. In the paper at hand, I use an
intermediate approach: owners cannot extract profits, but there is a manager
who maximizes profits to enjoy nonmonetary benefits.
27 See Prüfer, supra note 9.
28 Edward L. Glaeser, Introduction, in THE GOVERNANCE OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
(Univ. of Chicago Press 2003).
29 Marco A. Castaneda, John Garen & Jeremy Thornton, Competition, Contractibility, and the
Market for Donors to Nonprofits, 24 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 215 (2007).
30 Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson, The Nonprofit Sector and Industry Performance, 90
J. PUB. ECON. 1681 (2006).
31 Nancy H. Chau & Marieke Huysentruyt, Nonprofits and Public Good Provision: A Contest
Based on Compromises, 50 EUR. ECON. REV. 1909 (2006).
32 Kuan, supra note 19.
33 Glaeser and Shleifer, supra note 18.
34 Marc Bilodeau & Al Slivinski, Rival Charities, 66 J. PUB. ECON. 449 (1997).
35 Francois, supra note 20.











A. Demand: Heterogeneous Preferences for Quality
There is a unit mass of consumers. Each consumer i demands one unit of a
product and obtains utility from consumption ui(p, b, q, ui), which is
decreasing in the first argument and increasing in the others. p is the
uniform price charged for a unit of the product or service. b  0 is the
exogenous basic utility that providers must produce to get a license to offer
their services. This reflects inelastic unit demand for a service of basic
quality and the existence of a regulator ensuring a minimum quality stan-
dard in the industry. ui, which is drawn from a uniform distribution over the
interval [0,1], denotes the individual preference for additional quality, q.
Henceforth, I will use the following quasi-linear specification of consumer
i’s utility function, but drop the index i wherever possible:
uið p; b; q; uiÞ ¼ bþ uiq p: ð1Þ
B. Supply: A Consumer-Dominated Nonprofit
There are two producers j [ fA;Bg competing for the consumers. Market
entry costs of third parties are prohibitive.36 Owners of the organizations,
that is, its final decision-makers, are risk-neutral and have zero reservation
utility. They determine quality levels first; only then the managers determine
prices (see below for more details on timing). Without loss of generality, I
assume that producers have the common belief that qA  qB. Monetary
profits are defined in the usual way:
pj ¼ pjsj  CðqjÞ;
where sj denotes producer j’s output, which equals its market share if the
market is covered. CðqjÞ ¼ sjq2j are total costs. I normalize all other costs to
zero. This specification captures that production of higher quality gets more
and more expensive and that higher quality also increases marginal costs of
output. It rules out economies or diseconomies of scale, which are discussed
in some empirical papers on healthcare markets without finding clear-cut
results.37 Moreover, it is obvious that the introduction of economies
36 Shaked and Sutton show that, in a market with quality-differentiated goods and under
standard assumptions, at most two goods can have a positive market share. Shaked &
Sutton, supra note 10.
37 See Daniel Bilodeau, Pierre-Yves Crémieux & Pierre Ouellette, Hospital Cost Function in a
Non-Market Health Care System, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 489 (2000); Paul Gertler &
Donald M. Waldman, Quality Adjusted Cost Functions and Policy Evaluation in the Nursing
Home Industry, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1232 (1992); Ciaran O’Neill & Ann Largey, Issues in Cost
Function Specification for Neonatal Care: The Fordham Case, 19 J. PUB. HEALTH MED. 50
(1997).










(diseconomies) of scale would benefit (penalize) a single entity over two
competitors. Therefore, assuming economies (diseconomies) of scale would
make the case for (against) mergers independent of the type of merger even
stronger. Because this paper focuses on the relative welfare effects of mergers
among nonprofits compared with mergers among for-profit firms, I assume
the most simple case of constant returns to scale, where marginal and
average costs of production are constant in output.
Nonprofits are required to meet a non-distribution constraint: if profits
are positive, they can either be retained or be donated to a charity not
modeled as a strategic player, which is a common legal rule internation-
ally. The charity is part of the economy, hence donations are not lost
when calculating total welfare. This rules out profit maximization as the
objective function of rational owners. However, it is not clear in general
which objective function owners of nonprofits do maximize (see the dis-
cussion in Part II).
I model competition between so-called consumer-dominated nonprofits.
In such an organization, by assumption, the pivotal owner of organization j
maximizes his individual net consumption utility. In practice, this could
refer to a hospital where the pivotal owner lives close-by and expects that he
will be treated in the hospital himself. For instance, if the votes of each non-
profit board member had equal weight, the member with median prefer-
ences for quality would be the pivotal owner. Formally, the consumer-owner
solves:
maxqj u ¼ bþ uqj  pj ; ð2Þ
where u is his individual preference for quality.
To reproduce the stylized fact that in many nonprofits ownership and
control are separated and that the interest of the persons with day-to-day
control is not necessarily aligned with the persons holding residual control, I
model a manager in each organization (see Part V for a discussion of this
assumption). Although the owners can determine the long-term variable,
quality, and set up the manager’s employment contract, the manager is in
charge of the short-term variable, price.38
As the focus of this paper is not on contractual design, I assume that
quality is contractible. This assumption is a reduced form of the following
set of assumptions. Assume that quality is noncontractible but observable
for buyers after consumption. Thus, if the pivotal owner is a buyer himself,
he will learn the quality produced by the manager. If he is not satisfied, he
can refuse to prolong the manager’s contract. Hence, the manager has an
incentive to produce the quality preferred by the pivotal owner. Assuming
that quality is contractible has the same effect. Alternatively, there could
38 Because I use only a one-shot game, “long-term” and “short-term” are translated into the
model by letting owners choose quality before the manager determines price.










exist a monitoring technology by which the owners can learn the quality
produced.
The manager will only be paid a wage if he produces the quality specified
by the owners. Because of his specialized knowledge on running the organiz-
ation, however, the manager has private knowledge on the cost function under
which it operates. Consequently, he has discretion when setting the price.
Notwithstanding the owners’ goals, the manager maximizes economic
profits. This is a shortcut to assuming that he maximizes his own nonmone-
tary utility. To achieve this goal, he needs positive economic profits to spend
on the nonmonetary benefits such that the final accounting profit is zero.
Those benefits could come in the form of perks or as “enjoying a quiet life,”
as in Bertrand and Mullainathan.39
C. Timing
To produce benchmark results, I assume that the competing producers are
symmetric. This means that the pivotal owners have similar preferences for
quality: uA ¼ uB. I assume complete information with respect to quality and
price levels and solve the game for subgame-perfect equilibria in pure strat-
egies in the appendix. The timing is related to Shaked and Sutton:40
(1) t ¼ 1: Quality. The pivotal owner of each organization j chooses a
level of quality qj  0.
(2) t ¼ 2: Price. In each organization, the manager picks a price pj for the
product, thereby incurring costs C(qj).
(3) t ¼ 3: Buying. Each consumer learns the quality and price levels of
the nonprofits and his own u and may buy one product.
IV. ANALYSIS
Before analyzing mergers among nonprofits, I characterize the social
planner’s preferred solution, given that he only determines one quality level.
In the unconstrained first-best case, the social planner would choose two
distinct qualities. A low-quality product would be sold for a low price,
thereby making sure all consumers can afford consumption, and a high-
quality product would be sold for a higher price, thereby satisfying consu-
mers with a high preference for quality.
As will be clear below, however, under duopoly, the owners of nonprofits
A and B voluntarily set the same quality level. Then, to show the main
39 Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance
and Managerial Preferences, 111 J. POL. ECON 1043 (2003).
40 Shaked & Sutton, supra note 10.










result of this paper, it is sufficient to analyze the one-product case under
monopoly (if the monopolist sets two quality levels, the main result becomes
even stronger). To compare results, it is sufficient to study the quality and
price decisions of a social planner in the one-product case.
A. Social Planner’s Choice in the One-Product Case









qÞdu ð1 uÞq2: ð3Þ
In equation (3), u ¼ ð p bÞ=q defines the marginal consumer for q . 0 who
is indifferent between buying the product and not buying.41
The social planner sets the price equal to marginal costs of production:
p ¼ q2. Hence, output is s ¼ ð1 uÞ ¼ 1þ ðb=qÞ  q, which means that
demand is quality sensitive as long as b , q2. Substituting this into equation






if b , q2;
bþ q
2




This expression illustrates the tradeoff of the social planner: only a high
quality level lets quality-loving consumers (high u-types) enjoy high utility.
On the other hand, producing a low quality level allows for selling the good
for a low price and therefore increases demand, which is especially good for
welfare if the basic utility b is large. However, if b  q2, there is no tradeoff
anymore, because further quality reduction (and subsequent price
reduction) does not increase demand further on.
In Appendix A, I calculate the social planner’s preferred quality and price
levels and the corresponding total welfare. The main intuition of those
results is that the level of the basic utility b equally enjoyed by all consumers
when they get hold of the product matters a lot. If b is sufficiently high, the
social planner will set a price that makes sure all consumers can afford the
product and thereby enjoy the high basic utility. This avoids inefficient
exclusion at the lower end of the preference-for-quality spectrum. Then, all
revenues are used to produce additional quality, thereby paying some tribute
to quality-loving consumers. In contrast, if b is low, it does not pay for the
social planner to sell to all consumers. Consequently, the lower the basic
utility is, the higher the social planner pushes additional quality (and price),
which drives out more and more consumers.
41 This formulation of welfare uses the fact that the average u of buying consumers is ð1þ uÞ=2.











In t ¼ 3, consumers choose which producer from which to buy. A consumer
prefers to buy from organization A if he cannot increase his net consumption
utility by buying from B, that is, if b þ uqA – pA  b þ uqB – pB. Solving this
expression for the indifferent consumer located at û gives:
û ¼ pA  pB
qA  qB
: ð5Þ
To sell a positive quantity, producer B has to make sure that the partici-
pation constraint of consumers holds, that is, that b þ uqB – pB  0. Solving
this expression for the consumer who is indifferent between buying and not
buying gives:
u ¼ pB  b
qB
: ð6Þ
It follows from equation (6) that all consumers buy some product (u ¼ 0) if
pB  b. In this case, sB ¼ 1 sA. Similarly, it follows from equation (6) that
no consumer will buy any product if u ¼ 1, which holds for pB  b þ qB.
Due to assumed beliefs, that qA  qB, the consumers with highest prefer-
ences for quality, located between û and 1, will buy from A. Consumers
with medium preferences, located between u and û , will buy from















 pB  b
qB
if b , pB , bþ qB; ð8Þ
sA ¼ sB ¼ 0 if pB  bþ qB: ð9Þ
Henceforth, I will refer to equation (7) as the case where the market is
covered, to equation (8) as the case where demand is elastic, and to equation
(9) as the case where the market breaks down.
In t ¼ 2, managers determine the prices pA and pB. The manager of
organization j, who maximizes profits, chooses pj to solve:
max
pj
pj sjð pjÞ  sjð pjÞq2j : ð10Þ
In Appendix B, I solve the model for a subgame-perfect equilibrium in
which both nonprofits have positive market shares. To do this, I first estab-
lish that in duopoly competition between symmetric nonprofits, there exists
no subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies in which qA = qB.
Instead, in such an equilibrium, qA ¼ qB.










The idea behind this result is the following. Consumer-owners prefer that
nonprofits price according to marginal cost and do not charge a markup on
top of marginal cost. This holds because a positive markup increases the
price they need to pay as consumers in t ¼ 3, but the sellers’ profits associ-
ated with such a markup do not give the owners additional utility due to the
nondistribution constraint. Next, I show that the only way for nonprofit
owners to constrain their managers from setting a price above marginal cost
is to choose a similar level of quality in both nonprofits in t ¼ 1 and,
thereby, to let the managers face Bertrand competition with homogeneous
products in t ¼ 2. This result complements Shaked and Sutton, who show
that, in equilibrium, duopolistic profit-maximizing firms never produce the
same level of quality—for the very reason to avoid Bertrand price
competition.42
That result is also interesting from another perspective. By assumption,
the managers in my model have some discretion over pricing, which they
are eager to use, because their objective function is different from the one
of owners. However, despite the lack of intraorganizational constraints on
managerial behavior, I find that nonprofit owners can strategically use
product market competition to discipline their managers. This discipline
forces managers to price according to marginal cost and, hence, takes away
their market power. It gives the owners the maximum amount of resources,
which they can spend according to their objective function, (2). As a con-
sequence, subgame-perfect equilibrium prices in duopoly competition are
pA ¼ pB ¼ q2A ¼ q2B, and both producers share the market equally.
As the next step in Appendix B, I calculate equilibrium qualities, prices,
and market shares for the cases where the market is covered and where
demand is elastic. Which of the two cases occurs depends on the owners’
preference for quality, u, and the basic utility from consumption, b. I show
that owners increase quality in line with their own preferences for quality.
Due to the positive basic quality b, this has the effect that, for low u, all con-
sumers buy the product, even if they do not value additional quality, q . 0,
at all. If u exceeds a certain threshold, the consumers with the lowest prefer-
ence for additional quality drop out of the market. Due to the individual
utility maximization of the consumer-owners, however, the market never
breaks down, even if u reaches its maximum, 1.
To conclude the analysis of the duopoly competition case, I present the
corresponding welfare result in Appendix B, that is, the precise levels of con-
sumer surplus, producer surplus, and the sum of both, total welfare. This
result will be interpreted below, where I compare it with welfare in the mon-
opoly case, which is the topic of the following section.
42 See Shaked & Sutton, supra note 10, at 7.










C. Merger to Monopoly
Now let the two nonprofits merge and form a monopoly in the market. I do
not assume a special reason for the merger, because the focus of this paper
is on the impact of the nonprofit organizational form on the welfare effects
of the merger. Therefore, the subsequent analysis could come on top of a
traditional merger analysis that focuses on aspects other than organizational
form.43 In particular, I rule out efficiency gains of mergers because of econ-
omies of scale.
After a merger, there is only one pivotal owner, by definition. However,
there could still be two products, A and B, such that the owner could deter-
mine two quality levels, qA and qB. Nevertheless, because of the fact that
there is only one pivotal consumer-owner and that this owner only has an
individual demand of one unit, it is sufficient for him to tailor one product
(quality) to his needs. He is indifferent with respect to the second quality
level. Therefore, I assume that the single owner determines a single quality
level, which is produced by a single manager. Note that introducing a
second product that serves consumers who cannot afford the pivotal owner’s
preferred quality would increase the welfare of the merger scenario when
compared with the welfare of the single product market modeled here. This
would make the main result of this paper, comparing welfare under duopoly
and under monopoly, even stronger (as is explained below).
It is also practically impossible for the owner to hire two managers and
let each one run one production facility, thereby facing competition from
the other manager. This would not work because those two managers would
need to be monitored by a specialist, a job that the owner cannot perform
himself. The specialist, however, would act as a monopolistic manager with
discretion over pricing. If instead the owner had the expertise to monitor
managers, he could run one nonprofit—the one that produces the good he
wishes to consume—himself. Along the same lines, the assumption that
quality is contractible depends on the fact that the owner actually consumes
the product himself (as is explained in Part III.B). As he only demands one
unit, it is de facto impossible to contract on two quality levels.
Note that the fact that it is sufficient to study the one-product monopoly
case also explains why the social planner’s preferred choice of quality and
price was characterized for the one-product case in Part IV.A.
In Appendix C, I calculate the subgame-perfect equilibrium consisting of
the quality and price choices of the monopolistic nonprofit owner and the
resulting demand for the single product offered in the market. I show that
demand is elastic if the owner’s preference for quality, u, is sufficiently high.
If it is low, the owner prefers to set quality to such a low level—and the
manager accordingly decreases the profit-maximizing price—that all
43 See Part II for some references on mergers among profit-maximizing firms.










consumers buy the product. For u , 1=2, this even means that additional
quality q ¼ 0, unlike the duopoly case where q . 0 for all u . 0. To make
the monopoly result comparable with the duopoly case, I also calculate the
corresponding welfare result in the appendix.
By comparing welfare levels, I find the following key result of this paper.
A monopolistic consumer-dominated nonprofit can create higher total
welfare than competing consumer-dominated nonprofits.
This result shows that mergers between consumer-dominated nonprofits
need not be a bad thing, as they can increase welfare and do not unambigu-
ously decrease it. Note that the case where such a merger decreases welfare
also exists, related to the result of Philipson and Posner.44 The latter mech-
anism is not the focus of this paper, though.
What is the intuition of this key result? To better understand it, I plotted
equilibrium quality and price levels for a numerical example in Figure 1.
The left panel illustrates for this case that competing consumer-dominated
nonprofits produce higher quality than a monopolist: qNN . qN (for the
corner solution u ¼ 1, qNN ¼ qN). This is intuitive because the monopolistic
manager maximizes profits, which implies that he produces less quality for a
given market price. Competitive nonprofits, in contrast, face Bertrand price
competition and sell for marginal cost. Therefore, they can afford to
produce higher quality for a given price.
Now it is enlightening to compare quality levels produced in the market
with the quality preferred by the social planner, which is also displayed in
the left panel of Figure 1. In the example, qSP is strictly lower than both qNN
and qN. Due to the fact that qNN . qN, however, the social planner’s quality
is closer to the monopolistic quality than to the duopoly quality for all
u [ ½0:806; 1Þ. Rephrased, the quality levels chosen in duopoly and mon-
opoly are both inefficiently high in the figure but, under monopoly, the over-
production of quality is less intense.
These quality ratios translate into equilibrium prices. The right panel of
Figure 1 illustrates, for the same numerical example, that the price
level under duopoly is strictly higher than the price level under monopoly:
pNN . pN. For the entire support of u [ ½0:806; 1, the difference between
the duopoly price and the social planner’s price, j pNN – pSP j, is larger
than the difference between the monopoly price and the social planner’s
price, j pN – pSPj.
In a nutshell, if two consumer-dominated nonprofits merge to monopoly,
quality decreases and the price-to-quality ratio increases. However, there are
cases where both the quality level and the price level under competition are
excessive when compared with the social planner’s preferred levels. A
merger reduces the absolute quality and price levels and brings them more
in line with the levels preferred by the social planner. In net welfare terms,
44 Philpson & Posner, supra note 7.










this reduction of excessive quality can outweigh the loss created by mon-
opoly pricing of the manager.
In the numerical example illustrated in Figure 1, the positive effect of a
merger on welfare occurs because the basic utility from consumption is
high, b  1=12, such that all consumers buy the product in the duopoly
case. High levels of regulated basic utility (or minimum quality) can be
found in the hospital sector, for instance. If the pivotal owners’ preference
for quality, u, is also high, quality and price are driven up such that, in the
monopoly case, demand becomes elastic. If within this range (u  0.806, in
the example), u is reduced, the parallel reduction of quality and price allows
more consumers to buy the good, which increases welfare. The same
reduction of u in the duopoly case does not have such a positive effect on
demand, though, because the market is already covered. This prevents
welfare in the duopoly case to increase as much as in the monopoly case.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Separation of Ownership and Control
Why introduce a manager to carry out day-to-day business and to decide p?
Why do the owners not determine both q and p themselves? Let us assume,
in contrast to the above model, that the pivotal consumer-owner of a non-
profit can decide q and p together. He maximizes u(p, b, q, u) over q, p such
that p  0. As he does not benefit from positive profits, p ¼ 0, which
implies choosing p ¼ q2. The remaining reduced maximization problem is
similar to the one analyzed above in the duopoly competition case. Hence,
the consumer-owner chooses the same quality and price levels as found
there. These choices are independent of the degree of competition, though.
In other words, such a mighty pivotal owner acts in the same way not
regarding the competitive environment he operates in. Mergers have no
effect on his behavior.
Figure 1. Numerical example for b ¼ 0.4. Notes: Horizontal axis: u e[0.806, 1]. The three
curves in the left [right] panel plot equilibrium quality [price] levels under duopoly
(qNN)[pNN], monopoly (qN)[pN], and social planner’s choice (qSP)[pSP].










In contrast, empirical studies, such as that by Malani, Philipson, and
David,45 show that the degree of competition indeed influences behavior in
nonprofits. Separation of ownership and control is a ubiquitous fact in all
types of organizations in practice. This is true, in particular, in industries
where very specialized knowledge of the production technology (reflecting
owners’ decisions on q) is needed in line with specialized business knowledge
(reflecting the manager’s decision on p in my model)—for instance, in
healthcare, where experts in both disciplines, management and medical
science, are rare.
Despite the business ignorance of owners, they set q in my model and
know the reaction function of the manager and, hence, indirectly also deter-
mine p(q). More realistically, this could be interpreted in a way such that
owners cannot foresee p(q) exactly but believe in some distribution function
of possible reaction functions of the manager. p(q) would then be the expec-
tation of that distribution function.
B. More than Two Suppliers
The main goal of my model is to show that the objectives of nonprofit
owners can actually affect the welfare result of a merger. For this end, mod-
eling a merger from duopoly to monopoly is sufficient, as it shows the main
mechanism in a simple way. To characterize conditions that better predict
which real mergers may be welfare-improving, a richer model is required.
This is a fruitful area of future research. The intuition of this paper’s main
result, however, can be generalized to the extent that the market power of
the manager increases in the course of a merger. Then, the manager can
increase the price, which leads to a decrease of equilibrium quality.
Overproduction of quality is diminished, which can lead to a welfare gain
along the lines identified above.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has analyzed the welfare effects of mergers among so-called
consumer-dominated nonprofits. Its main question, whether mergers among
nonprofits should be treated differently by antitrust law from mergers among
for-profit firms, has been studied by constructing a model of duopoly compe-
tition related to Shaked and Sutton.46 After imposing a merger to monopoly
between two nonprofits, I have shown that, holding all else equal, welfare can
either decrease or increase after a merger. Consequently, the organizational
form of the merging parties and the objectives of their pivotal owners can
have a critical effect on welfare. This finding is relevant for antitrust law.
45 Malani, Philipson & David, supra note 3.
46 Shaked & Sutton, supra note 10.










This result complements the conclusion of Philipson and Posner.47 The
differences are due to several assumptions in my paper, the inclusion of
which Philipson and Posner48 call for: (1) Philipson and Posner agree that
firm governance should be addressed and point to the fact that decision-
makers in nonprofits “may have [more] trouble agreeing on the right course
of action for the nonprofit” as for-profit firms.49 (2) They speculate, based
on the insight that nonprofit governance is important, that nonprofits “are
more likely to be disciplined by output markets rather than by input markets
or corporate control.”50 (3) “Other utility functions should be considered in
future work.”51
This paper addresses all three points: (1) It builds on a governance-based
model of nonprofits52 that emphasizes the role of owners’ objectives for their
behavior on output markets. The assumption of heterogeneous owner pre-
ferences and the concept of the pivotal owner relate to the lack of goal align-
ment in many nonprofits. (2) This paper shows that nonprofits can indeed
be disciplined by competition in output markets—it only disagrees that this
ability is welfare-increasing in general. (3) This paper analyzes the effects of
a nonprofit objective function that differs from Philipson and Posner’s,53
namely, to maximize the pivotal owner’s own consumption utility from verti-
cally differentiated goods.
The next steps in improving our understanding of mergers among non-
profits and nonprofit behavior in general are twofold. First, to better charac-
terize the conditions that predict which mergers may be welfare-improving,
a richer model that incorporates variables that are easy to observe empiri-
cally is required. In particular, is it possible to map a certain type of nonpro-
fit—for example, a consumer-dominated nonprofit—to an existing legal
form of organization? Second, the model, in particular, the idea of the exist-
ence of different types of nonprofits, awaits empirical testing. Can the
current empirical controversy about the effects of nonprofits on price,
output, quality, and other variables of interest be explained if data sets are
split according to the type of nonprofit?
APPENDIX A: THE SOCIAL PLANNER’S DECISIONS
Solving the social planner’s maximization problem (4) leads to the following
result.
47 Philipson & Posner, supra note 7.




52 See Prüfer, supra note 9.
53 Philipson & Posner, supra note 7.










Result A.1 (Social planner’s preferred quality and price). (i) Consider b1/
16: the social planner chooses a quality level of qSP ¼ 1=4 and sells for pSP ¼ 1=16
to s ¼ 1 consumer. This generates total welfare of WSP ¼ bþ 1=16. (ii) Consider














of consumers buys the product, that is, s [ ½2=ð3; 1Þ for b [ ½ð0; 1Þ=16. Welfare









Proof. (i) The second line of equation (4) has a straightforward solution,
qSP ¼ 1=4, which is valid if b  q2 ¼ 1=16 and leads to pSP ¼ 1=16, s¼ 1, and a
welfare of W ¼ bþ 1=16. (ii) The only quality level that is nonnegative, gener-





is a welfare maximum, which exists 8b  1=12. As the case in equation (4)
requires a stronger condition, b , 1=16 (see above), the latter is always fulfilled.























Note that both cases (i) and (ii) converge at b ¼ 1=16, where qSP ¼ 1=4,
pSP ¼ 1=16, s ¼ 1, and WSP ¼ 1=8.
APPENDIX B. DUOPOLY COMPETITION
The central goal of this section is to characterize the subgame-perfect
equilibrium in duopoly competition, which is stated in Result B.3. This
main positive result is complemented by the normative result on welfare,
Result B.4. It is preceded by an analysis of managerial pricing behavior,
given that quality levels are fixed (Result B.1), and an analysis of owners’
quality choices, knowing how managers will react to these choices (Result
B.2).
Solving the maximization problem of organization j’s manager, equation
(10) shows:
Result B.1 (Price Nash equilibria). (i) In t ¼ 2, all Nash equilibria in pure
strategies that lead to positive market shares for both producers (sA, sB . 0) and
where qA = qB lead to positive price markups (MA, MB . 0). (ii) The only pure
strategy Nash equilibrium with a (qA, qB)-combination that leads to positive
market shares and to zero markups is characterized by qA ¼ qB.
Proof. Define:
MelasticA ;
ðqA  qBÞðbþ 2qAð1 qAÞ  qAqBÞ
4qA  qB
; ðB:1Þ





















ðqA þ q2A  qB  q2BÞ: ðB:4Þ
After maximizing equation (10), these definitions allow to express Nash
equilibrium prices in t ¼ 2 as:
pelasticA ¼ q2A þMelasticA ; pelasticB ¼ q2B þMelasticB if b , pB , bþ qB; ðB:5Þ
pcoveredA ¼ q2A þMcoveredA ; pcoveredB ¼ q2B þMcoveredB if pB  b; ðB:6Þ
where Mj is the price markup on the marginal cost of organization j in





ð2 qA  qBÞ; scoveredB ¼
1
3
ð1þ qA þ qBÞ ðB:7Þ
in the covered market case. In the elastic case, the producers sell:
selasticA ¼
bþ qAð2ð1 qAÞ  qBÞ
4qA  qB
; selasticB ¼
qAð2bþ qBð1 qBÞ þ qAqBÞ
qBð4qA  qBÞ
: ðB:8Þ
To prepare subsequent results, I have to check when the price markups are





































A ; 2 qB ; q
þ;covered
B ; ð1þ qAÞ:
Solving equations (B.1) and (B.2) for zero yields that MelasticA ¼ 0, for
qA ¼fqB; qA ; qþAg. MelasticB ¼ 0, for qB ¼ fqA; qB ; qþBg. McoveredA ¼ 0, for
qA ¼ fqB; qþ;coveredA g. McoveredB ¼ 0, for qB ¼ fqA; q
þ;covered
B g. Substituting these
values into the individual demand functions in equations (B.7) or (B.8),
respectively, and assuming qA, qB . 0 yields:











scoveredA ðqA ¼ qBÞ ¼
2
3















selasticA ðqA ¼ qAÞ ¼ selasticA ðqA ¼ qþAÞ ¼ scoveredA ðqA ¼ q
þ;covered
A Þ ¼ 0;
selasticA ðqA , qA , qþAÞ . 0;
scoveredA ðqA , q
þ;covered
A Þ . 0;
selasticB ðqB ¼ qBÞ ¼ selasticB ðqB ¼ qþBÞ ¼ scoveredB ðqB ¼ q
þ;covered
B Þ ¼ 0;
selasticB ðqB , qB , qþBÞ . 0;
scoveredB ðqB , q
þ;covered
B Þ . 0: Q:E:D:
Considering only cases where the producers sell positive quantities in the
market, this result implies that the price equals marginal cost if and only if
qA ¼ qB. This is intuitive because only then the two products are not differ-
entiated and price competition in t ¼ 2 resembles the classical Bertrand
game with homogeneous goods.
In t ¼ 1, what is the standpoint of owners on a price equal to marginal cost,
q2j , when compared with positive price markups? All else equal, consumer-
owners prefer a markup of zero, because a positive markup increases the price
they must pay as consumers in t ¼ 3 but does not give them additional utility
from increased quality. Due to the nondistribution constraint, they would
also not benefit from the producer surplus that would be generated through
positive markups. Given that the pivotal owners of A and B could coordinate,
they would first agree to set the same level of quality, qA ¼ qB, thereby making
sure the markup is zero. Then, they would jointly choose the quality level that
maximizes their consumption utility, assuming the price markup is zero. They
can fix the same quality level without explicit coordination. Expecting that
the other pivotal owner sets this jointly optimal quality, each owner cannot do
better if he chooses a different quality because it would lead to positive
markups. This insight is summarized in the following result.
Result B.2 (Quality Nash equilibrium). In t ¼ 1, in duopoly competition
between symmetric nonprofits, there exists no subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure
strategies in which qA = qB. In equilibrium, qA ¼ qB.
Proof. Substituting pj ¼ q2j þMjðqj ; qk=jÞ for the price variable in the objec-
tive function of owners yields that the pivotal consumer-owner of nonprofit j















Hence, c.p. any Mj(qj, qk=j) . 0 decreases the pivotal owner’s utility. Now
define qk=j as the qk=j that solves argmaxfbþ uqk=j  ðq2k=j þ 0Þg, and note
that qk=j depends on a markup of Mk ¼ 0. Then, by the definition of q

k=j ,
[equation (B.11)], and Result B.1, the unique qj that solves
argmaxfbþ uqj  ðq2j þMjðqj ; qk=jÞg, is qj ¼ qk=j ; qj : Q:E:D:
Result B.2 states that the only way for nonprofit owners to keep their man-
agers from setting a price above marginal cost is to determine the same level
of quality in t ¼ 1 and, thereby, to let the managers face Bertrand compe-
tition with homogeneous products in t ¼ 2. It follows from Results B.1 and
B.2 that subgame-perfect equilibrium prices in duopoly competition are:
pA ¼ pB ¼ q2A ¼ q2B ðB:12Þ
and that both producers share the market equally:
sA ¼ sB ¼
1
2
if q2B  b ðB:13Þ
sA ¼ sB ¼
1 u
2




if b , q2B , bþ qB; ðB:14Þ
sA ¼ sB ¼ 0 if bþ qB  q2B: ðB:15Þ
These preliminaries allow me to characterize the unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium in the following result.
Result B.3 (Subgame-perfect equilibrium when nonprofits compete).
Depending on the preferences of the pivotal owners, u, consumer-dominated nonpro-









, demand is elastic:
sA ¼ sB ¼ 1=2ð Þ þ b=uð Þ  u=4ð Þ:
Proof. Substituting equation (B.12) in equation (1) and maximizing with
respect to qj yields qA ¼ qB ¼ u=2 ; qNN. Substituting qNN in equation
(B.12) gives pA ¼ pB ¼ u2=4 ; pNN. Substituting qNN in equations (B.13)–









, and that in the elastic demand case the marginal buyer is
located at u=2ð Þ  2b=uð Þ, which implies an output per producer of
sA ¼ sB ¼ 1=2ð Þ þ b=uð Þ  u=4ð Þ. Due to the fact that the upper bound on u





breakdown case is never reached in this scenario. Q.E.D.
The welfare result corresponding to Result B.3 is:










Result B.4 (Welfare under duopoly). Producer surplus is zero. Consumer
surplus and welfare are:
CS ¼W ¼ bþ u u
2
4





CS ¼W ¼ ð4bþ ðu 2ÞuÞ
2
16u





Proof. This result follows from Result B.3. Because of marginal cost pricing,
producer surplus is 0. Thus, consumer surplus equals total welfare, which is
bþ 1=2qNNð Þ  q2NN ¼ bþ u u2
 
=4 in the covered market case. If demand
is elastic, welfare is:
ð1
u=2ð Þ 2b=uð Þ
ðbþ 1þ u=2ð Þ 2b=uð Þ
2




APPENDIX C. MONOPOLISTIC NONPROFIT
Consumer behavior in t ¼ 3 is independent of the market structure.
Hence, equations (7)–(9) imply the demand for the single product, s, where
s ¼ sA þ sB. If demand is elastic, s ¼ bþ q pð Þ=q: If the market is covered,
s ¼ 1. If the market breaks down, s ¼ 0.
In t ¼ 2, the manager maximizes profits as in equation (10). Due to the
absence of competition, he will set a price depending on quality, the analog
of equation (B.12), as:




which leads to demand of:






























The subgame-perfect equilibrium is characterized in the following result.










Result C.1 (Subgame-perfect equilibrium in monopoly). A monopolistic
consumer-dominated nonprofit sets quality and price such that in equilibrium:




















4u2 þ 4b 1
8











Proof. Substituting equation (C.1) in equation (1) gives q ¼ u 1=2. As q
cannot be negative, this holds only for u . 1=2. For u  1=2, q ¼ 0, which
leads to profit-maximizing pricing of p ¼ b and, subsequently, s¼ 1.
Substituting q ¼ u 1=2 in equation (C.1) yields a monopoly price of
p ¼ 4u2 þ 4b 1
 





=2. In this case, demand equals
s ¼ q pþ bð Þ=q ¼ 3 2uð Þ=4þ b= 2u 1ð Þ. In the intermediate case, where




=2, demand is inelastic. Thus, s¼ 1, p¼ b, and
q ¼ u 1=2: Q:E:D:
The impact of the merger on total welfare is stated in the following result.
Result C.2 (Welfare in monopoly). Welfare is given by:
W ¼ b for u  1
2
; ðC:8Þ











W ¼ 3ð3 4bþ 4ðu 2ÞuÞ
2






Proof. This proof builds on Result C.1. If u  1=2, consumer surplus is
1(b þ 0 – b) ¼ 0, whereas producer surplus is s(p – q2) ¼ 1(b – 0) ¼ b,




=2, producer surplus is
sð p q2Þ ¼ 1ðb ðu 1=2Þ2Þ ¼ bþ u u2  1=4. Consumer surplus is
1 bþ 1=2ð Þq pð Þ ¼ bþ 1=2ðu 1=2Þ  b ¼ 2u 1ð Þ=4, which sums to the




=2, then producer surplus










equals ð3 4bþ 4ðu 2ÞuÞ2=32ð2u 1Þ, consumer surplus equals
ð3 4bþ 4ðu 2ÞuÞ2=64ð2u 1Þ, which sums to the welfare of
3ð3 4bþ 4ðu 2ÞuÞ2=64ð2u 1Þ: Q:E:D:
Result C.2 allows for a comparison of welfare under duopoly and mon-
opoly, which is stated in the following result.
Result C.3 (Merger welfare effects). A monopolistic consumer-dominated
nonprofit can create higher total welfare than competing consumer-dominated
nonprofits.

















, welfare under duopoly is given by equation
(B.16) and welfare under monopoly by equation (C.10). Consider b ¼ 0.4,









, shows that eligible u-values lie between 0.806
and 1.265. As u is only defined between zero and one, the relevant range to
be considered is u [ ½0:806; 1. For a value of u ¼ 0.815, for instance,
welfare under monopoly exceeds welfare under duopoly:
ðC:10Þ  ðB:16Þ ju¼0:815 ¼ 0:014 . 0: Q:E:D:
Figure 2 illustrates this example.
Figure 2. Numerical example for b ¼ 0.4. Notes: Horizontal axis: u e[0.806, 1]. The curve
WN – WNN illustrates the welfare difference between monopoly and duopoly, which is positive
for u , 0.835 and negative for u . 0.835.
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